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Abstract. At a fundamental level, crime and corruption represent the 
failure to effectively control society (crime) and the state (corruption). 
Despite the fact that many countries like Mexico face problems in both 
areas, the literature exploring the links between the two remains limited. 
This paper explores the intersection of crime and corruption, drawing on 
the Mexican case for examples and discussion. After defining and 
differentiating the two concepts to broadly encompass violations of the rule 
of law by citizens (crime) and state officials (corruption), the paper reviews 
the handful of empirical studies exploring the crime-corruption linkage. It 
then turns to a discussion of the issue of causality, detailing how crime—
under certain conditions—facilitates corruption and corruption nurtures 
crime both directly and indirectly by way of a set of intervening variables. 
The paper highlights the common underlying determinants influencing 
both factors and examines the scope and reach of the model. It concludes 
by briefly laying out the next steps in the broader study of the interaction 
of state controls over society and societal controls over the state.   
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УДК 323 
ПРОБЛЕМЫ КОНТРОЛЯ В ОБЩЕСТВЕ И В ГОСУДАРСТВЕ: 
ПРЕСТУПНОСТЬ И КОРРУПЦИЯ НА ПРИМЕРЕ МЕКСИКИ 
 
Аннотация. На фундаментальном уровне преступность и коррупция 
свидетельствуют о неэффективности контроля в обществе 
                                                 
 This paper was presented at the 61st Annual meeting of the Southeastern Council of Latin 
American Studies (SECOLAS), Charleston, S.C. March 12-14, 2015.   
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(преступность) и в государстве (коррупция). Несмотря на то, что многие 
страны, как и Мексика, сталкиваются с проблемами в данной области, 
исследователи нечасто изучают взаимосвязи между преступностью и 
коррупцией. В данной статье рассматривается взаимовлияние 
преступности и коррупции на примере Мексики. Автор определяет и 
дифференцирует данные концепты для того, чтобы охватить широкий 
спектр правонарушений со стороны граждан (преступность) и 
государственных чиновников (коррупция), и на этой основе он 
проводит эмпирические исследования в контексте взаимосвязи 
преступности и коррупции. Также автор рассматривает вопрос 
причинно-следственных связей, уделяя особое внимание тому, как 
преступность – при определенных условиях – способствует коррупции, 
а коррупция создает питательную среду для преступности, как прямо, 
так и косвенно, при наличии ряда дополнительных переменных. В 
работе подчеркиваются общие детерминанты изучаемых феноменов и 
рассматриваются возможности применения предлагаемой модели. В 
заключение автор кратко обозначает следующие шаги в рамках более 
широкой проблематики исследования взаимосвязей в области контроля 
государства над обществом и общественного контроля над 
государством.    
 
Ключевые слова: преступность, коррупция, общество, государство, 
взаимосвязь преступности и коррупции, Мексика. 
 
 
Introduction  
At a fundamental level, crime and corruption represent the failure of a 
government and a people to effectively control society (crime) and the state 
(corruption).  But despite the fact that many countries like Mexico face 
serious problems with respect to both, the literature exploring the links 
between the two remains limited. Studies of corruption rarely incorporate 
crime as a possible determinant or consequence or vice versa (for a review 
of the literature on corruption see Dimant 2013 and Triesman 2007; for a 
review of crime in general see Nueman and Berger 1988, Pratt and Cullen 
2005, and Wilson 2013; for a review of crime in Mexico, see Widner, et al 
2011). This theoretical lacuna is somewhat surprising given that the 
orthodox economics-based approach to corruption—which is often defined 
by reference to the law itself—borrows heavily from the rational choice 
logic (risk v. opportunities) informing the study of crime (Becker 1968; 
Rock 2009). To be sure, there are some exceptions to this, but this lack of 
attention leaves open a number of questions regarding the nature of the 
relationship linking corruption to crime, the direction of causality, and the 
issue of shared determinants – or, to reiterate, the relationship between a 
government and a people’s control of society and the state. 
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This paper explores the intersection of crime and corruption drawing 
on the Mexican case for examples and discussion.1 Part one defines and 
differentiates the two key concepts. As defined here, the two concepts 
reach beyond conventional usage to encompass violations of the rule of law 
by citizens (crime) and state officials (corruption). Part two briefly explores 
the literature with a particular focus on the handful of empirical studies 
exploring the crime-corruption linkage. Concentrating solely in this paper 
on the issue of causality, part three then details how crime—under certain 
conditions—facilitates corruption and corruption nurtures crime both 
directly and indirectly by way of a set of intervening variables.2 Building 
further on the model, I then highlight the common underlying 
determinants influencing both factors as well as examine the scope and 
reach of the model. I conclude this exercise by briefly laying out the next 
steps in the broader study of the interaction of state controls over society 
and societal controls over the state.   
 
Concepts: Controlling Society/ Controlling the State  
Crime is conceptualized here broadly to refer to violations of the law by 
members of society. As such, it reaches beyond criminal law to encompass 
violations of civil and regulatory law.  Reflecting the complexity and scope 
of the law itself, crime in this context takes on many different forms, from 
blue-collar crime like robbery to white-collar violations of the commerce 
code, the labor code, health and safety laws, environmental regulations, 
etc. As such, violations can be differentiated along a wide range of criteria 
such as type (violent, non-violent, robbery, fraud, lack of compliance with 
building codes, tax fraud, drugs, ad infinitum), level of organization, 
motive, impact, etc. Disaggregating these types becomes important later in 
the analysis. Here it is important to note that regardless of specific type or 
classification, such violations of the rule of law by members of society 
fundamentally represent the failure of the state to effectively employ its 
“legitimate coercive power” to ensure security and protect those who have 
entrusted it to do so.3  
                                                 
1 Many of the ideas in this paper were initially explored in Morris (2011a). 
  
2 The scope here is limited to the issue of causality. The consequences of crime and 
corruption are huge, of course, ranging from the human costs (fear among the people, 
political and civic frustration, vigilantism, and reduced rates of economic growth) to the lack 
of interpersonal confidence, trust in the state, presidential approval, and even popular 
support for democracy (see Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Hinton and Montalvo 
2014; Karstedt and LaFree 2006; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). 
3 Many would argue that providing security constitutes the primary function of government. 
Whether authority is delegated via some sort of Hobbesian or Lockean social contract or 
acquired through a negotiated process by which an organized criminal group creates an 
effective and stationary protection racket (Tilly 1985), states are expected to utilize their 
power to protect people and property from harm by insiders and outsiders. This expectation 
constitutes, in turn, the foundation of the “legitimacy” people bestow on the state that, in a 
Weberian sense, qualifies and differentiates the state’s so-called monopoly of coercive force 
from the force exercised by others (challengers). The state, it should be stressed, does not 
simply enjoy a “monopoly of coercive force” within a territory since individuals and groups 
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Whereas the state is expected to mobilize its “legitimate monopoly of 
force” to control society, provide security, and hence curtail crime, in a 
general sense it is up to the institutions of the rule of law and democracy 
to limit or demarcate the state’s authority or, in short, to control state 
actors. As Francis Fukuyama (2014, 25) notes, these institutions 
“constrain the state’s power and ensure that it is used only in a controlled 
and consensual manner.” Whereas the rule of law limits what state 
officials can and cannot do in the exercise of their authority (it defines the 
“legitimate” part of the use of coercive power), democracy or the 
institutions of democratic accountability more specifically limit what the 
state can and cannot do with respect to certain individual rights (e.g. 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly) and especially key 
governmental procedures (e.g. how to select political leaders and how to 
make public policy). While defining corruption is highly contentious, with 
definitions ranging from a specific type of behavior by public officials to 
those referring to much broader institutional norms, systemic failures, and 
structural formula,4 it is broadly conceived here to encompass any such 
violations by state officials of the limits placed on their exercise of power. 
Just as crime represents illegal activity by members of society, corruption 
here represents the abuses of power by state officials broadly conceived 
(Morris 2014).  
As used here then, corruption, like crime, is an exceedingly broad 
concept encompassing a wide range of activities arising from virtually every 
corner and crevice of the state’s political and administrative systems. This 
                                                 
also utilize force for civil, criminal, or political purposes. What distinguishes the state from 
others is that the state’s use of coercive power is deemed “legitimate” or a priori appropriate 
by the public. Moreover, the state plays a role in shaping the contours of its own legitimacy 
through education and controls on social communication. To be sure, even the state’s use of 
coercive force in specific instances is not always considered legitimate and the state can and 
often does abuse its authority. As Green and Ward (2004, 1) note, the difference between 
robber barons and states without justice is “states claim the power to determine what is 
‘just’” (Green and Ward 2004, 1).  
 
4 Joseph Nye’s (1967) often used definition characterizes corruption as “behavior which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains.” Michael Johnston (2014, 9) similarly defines 
corruption as “the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit.” Rather than seeing 
corruption as a specific form of behavior tied to private gain, however, more recent definitions 
adopt broader, more systemic views that not only reach beyond private gain to include 
institutional and political gain, but also reach back to earlier, classical views that saw 
corruption as a systemic rather than a purely behavioral phenomenon. This includes 
Thompson’s (1995, 2013) and Lessig’s (2011, 2013) notions of institutional corruption where 
covert institutional norms—often legal exchanges—undermine an institution’s purpose 
(Warren 2004, 331;), Kurer’s (2005) or Rotherstein and Teorell’s (2008) emphasis on the 
impartial or nonuniversal implementation of public policy to define corruption, McGirr’s 
(2013) notion of deliberate indiscretion, Warren’s (2006) definition of corruption as the 
duplicitous exclusion in the making of policy by those affected by it, or Sandoval-Ballesteros’s 
(2013, 9) broad structural definition of corruption as a “specific form of social domination 
characterized by abuse, simulation, and misappropriation of resources arising from a 
pronounced differential in structural power.” 
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sweeping view of corruption parallels in many ways Green and Ward’s 
(2004) use of the concept “state crime.” 5 In addition to the more traditional 
forms of corruption (bribery, extortion, conflict of interest, nepotism, 
influence peddling), corruption here includes the abuse of human rights 
(torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances), electoral fraud, 
obstructions of justice, etc.: all clear violations by state officials of the rule 
of law and democratic institutions for either personal or political gain.6 As 
with crime, there are an assortment of ways to differentiate the many 
forms or classes of corruption (political versus administrative corruption, 
high-level versus low-level corruption, the particular state institution 
involved, abuse of human rights, electoral crimes, ad infinitum; see Morris 
2011b), which again will become important later, but all reflect a 
fundamental violation by state officials of the basic principles and 
boundaries of the state’s authority.  
Before considering the relationship between these two broad-based 
phenomena—abbreviated here to the concepts of crime and corruption—it 
is first important to acknowledge and dispense with some rather obvious 
tautological overhang. In most cases (not all, depending on the definition of 
corruption), corruption constitutes a crime. Indeed, the norms or 
standards establishing appropriate (i.e. noncorrupt) conduct for state 
officials—the authority that corruption is said to abuse—are normally 
spelled out in the written law. This fact obviously renders tautological the 
primary theoretical question about the relationship linking corruption and 
crime. To overcome this problem, I differentiate the acts by the actors 
involved since, even though corruption is a crime, it alone involves state 
officials and their use (or misuse) of state authority in the conduct of state 
affairs. Consequently, such acts are classified here as corruption, not 
crime. I take a similar approach when state officials engage in clearly 
criminal activities “off the clock” that are not traditionally considered 
corruption. This includes, for example, police operating an auto-theft or 
kidnapping ring, or the military illegally selling weapons or drugs. In such 
cases, of course, crime and corruption become almost indistinguishable. 
This is a particular problem in Mexico, of course. 7 Even though such acts 
                                                 
5 In defining state crime, Green and Ward (2004, 5-6) emphasize the operative goals of the 
state organization. This leads them to initially exclude corruption from state crime, though 
they later note that if the state allows certain acts, including corruption, that contribute to an 
organizational goal, even if this is not the motivation of the individual acting, then it 
constitutes organizational deviance.   
 
6 Such broad concepts raise the question of whether these components are internally 
correlated. There is some evidence of this. Kaufmann (2006, cited in Beyerle 2011), for 
example, links corruption to impunity, Ganesan (2007; cited in Beyerle 2011) ties it to 
repression, while Lofti (2014) and Uslaner (2008) link corruption at the higher levels of 
government (political corruption) to corruption at the lower levels (bureaucratic or petty 
corruption).  
 
7 There are many examples of these activities in Mexico throughout the years (see SourceMex 
2006-07-26 and 2008-09-03). Citing statistics from the SSP (Security Ministry), Excelsior 
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may be prosecuted as crime and officials may face criminal charges, I 
consider these sorts of acts under the heading of corruption since again it 
involves some form of the abuse of authority. This approach is similar to 
the one adopted in the study by Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia 
(2010) looking at the link between organized crime and corruption. On the 
other side of the equation, but in a similar manner, the offering of a bribe 
to a public official by a citizen also constitutes a crime. To avoid this 
problem, I do not consider the part of corruption involving the citizen to be 
a crime per se or corruption.8   
 
Literature Review 
The literature on corruption and crime rarely intersect. Eugene 
Dimant’s (2013, table 1) near exhaustive summary of works focusing on 
the causes of corruption, for instance, lists forty determinants, none of 
which refer to crime. Many corruption studies incorporate, and even 
emphasize, the concept of the rule of law, and while some measures of rule 
of law include crime and respect for the law within society (see Merkel 
2012), most studies tend to characterize rule of law as the effectiveness of 
the judicial and criminal justice systems (characteristics of the state, not 
society) or the extent to which the state and state officials abide by the law 
and the limits on state power (see O’Donnell 2004; Tamanaha 2004). Such 
conceptualizations, however, seem rather close to definitions of corruption, 
thus raising the issue of tautology (see Beyerle 2011).9 Indeed, in such 
studies the rule of law seems almost synonymous with effective 
                                                 
reported, for example, that 56 of the 897 kidnappers arrested from 2001 through the first half 
of 2008 were active or former members of a police department or the military (SourceMex 
September 24, 2008) This blurring of the lines can also be seen in revolving-door corruption 
where state officials leave office to work for the companies they had been policing. This is 
common in the white-collar world where former regulators leave office to take positions in the 
industries they once regulated, or even former police or military joining organize crime. Many 
former police and military officers in Mexico have gone on to pursue careers with DTOs 
(Grayson 2008, 2010).  
 
8 While the offering of a bribe is a criminal act, it is important to note that it may not always 
result in corruption since not all offers are accepted, nor are all bribes reciprocated with the 
public official delivering his/her part of the corrupt bargain.  
 
9 I (Morris 2014) contend that corruption itself is embedded in our conceptualizations of the 
rule of law and democracy. As a brief example, Guillermo O’Donnell (1999, 307) defines what 
he labels democratic rule of law as when the law is “fairly applied” and that its application is 
consistent “without taking into consideration the class, status, or power differentials of the 
participants….” Surely this definition incorporates corruption since by definition corruption 
involves violating the norms of official decision-making by taking into consideration factors 
like the power or money of others and is thus not fairly applied. Among other effects, 
embedded conceptualizations like this make it difficult to even contemplate the relationship 
between corruption and democracy, as many studies do, since corruption by definition is part 
of the absence of rule of law and democracy. 
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anticorruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013).10 Similarly, the analysis of crime 
also rarely seems to incorporate a concern for corruption. The most recent 
edition of James Q. Wilson's (2013) text Thinking about Crime, for instance, 
contains just one index reference to corruption, noting the perception that 
heroin use may lead to more police corruption (p. 183). Robert Agnew's 
(2005) general theory on crime similarly does not include corruption as an 
explanatory variable, focusing instead, as do most works on crime, on 
such factors as personality traits, family, school, peers, and work of the 
individual.  
There are some important exceptions to this pattern, of course (e.g. 
Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003; Yankah 2013; Uslaner 2008). The literature 
on organized crime in particular stresses how drug trafficking 
organizations cannot exist without corruption (see for instance Buscaglia 
and Van Dijk 2003; Buscaglia 2011 and Van Dijk 2007; Center for the 
Study of Democracy 2010; Collins 2011; Hung-En Sung 2004; O’Day  and 
López 2001; Hanson 2008; Shelley 2005), a view that dominates popular 
and political rhetoric. Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) 
captured this sentiment during a meeting of the National Council of Public 
Security in 2008: “Crime cannot be understood without the protection of 
impunity and corruption of the police” (author translation) (Milenio August 
27, 2008). While some cast crime as the causal agent influencing 
corruption and others see corruption as nurturing violence and instability 
(Human Rights Watch 2007 and Le Billon 2003, both cited in Beyerle 
2011), many characterize the relationship as reciprocal. John Bailey’s 
(2014, 9) model of Mexico’s “security trap,” for instance, ties crime, 
violence, corruption and impunity together in a mutually reinforcing 
manner, trapping the country in a state of low-level equilibrium.  
Beyond the literature on organized crime, some empirical studies 
explore the relationship, though such studies tend to speak more to 
correlation than to causation. In one such study focusing on the impact of 
organized crime, rule of law and corruption on national wealth, Jan Van 
Dijk (2007) uncovers a strong correlation linking a composite measure of 
organized crime to perceived levels of corruption, a finding that seems to 
substantiate the writings and conventional wisdom associating organized 
crime with corruption. Interestingly, however, he uses grand corruption as 
part of the composite measure of organized crime, thus raising the issue of 
partial endogeneity. Of equal importance, Van Dijk (2007) fails to find any 
correlation linking perceived corruption to selected measures of common 
crime. Other empirical studies also point to links between certain types of 
crime and certain measures of corruption. Cross-national studies by Dutta 
et al (2011) and Schneider and Buehn (2009), for example, find a 
                                                 
10 Even those who, like Warren (2006), differentiate rule of law from corruption, nonetheless 
seem to cast corruption as undermining the rule of law within the government rather than in 
society: The “harm to democracy [from corruption] is that the rule of law becomes less 
certain, excluding citizens from legal rights, protections and securities to which they are 
entitled” (Warren 2006, 805). 
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correlation linking the size of the informal economy to level of perceived 
corruption, a finding that supports Bailey’s (2014, 43) assertion tying 
Mexico’s informal economy to corruption. Focusing only on European 
states, the Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia (2010, 331) uncovered 
a strong correlation linking corruption to both organized crime and the 
informal (or grey) economy. Roh and Lee (2013), in turn, find an inverse 
relationship linking a composite measure of social capital—an indicator 
that includes a survey question on the respondent’s “willingness to accept 
a bribe”—to robbery (though not burglary) at both the country and 
individual level of analysis. Extending outward a bit further, Hunt (2004) 
links crime to corruption by showing that people are more likely to engage 
in petty corruption if they have been the victim of a fraud, robbery or 
assault (cited in Uslaner 2008, 80). Playing even further on perceptions, 
Dammert and Malone’s (2002) study on Argentina finds a correlation 
linking high levels of perceived corruption to a lack of confidence in the 
police and fear of crime: factors clearly tied to crime. Eric Uslaner (2008, 
82) also finds a correlation linking perceived malfeasance at the top 
(corruption) to the perceived extent of pickpocketing within society. 
Uslaner, however, seems to reverse the causal arrow found in the literature 
on organized crime, concluding that “corruption leads to more crime,” not 
the other way around (Uslaner 2008, 17). Finally, with a focus on Mexico’s 
thirty-one states and the federal district from 2007 to 2010, I (Morris 2013) 
found a correlation between the level of perceived corruption and the 
perception of insecurity. Such cross-state comparisons reveal that states 
at the forefront of the war on organized crime during these years and 
suffering the highest levels of violence exhibited slightly higher levels of 
insecurity and corruption (Morris 2013).  
 
Linking Crime and Corruption  
At the broadest level, there should be no a priori reason to expect a 
relationship linking crime and corruption. However, numerous scenarios 
and specific cases suggest that the two not only often go hand in hand, but 
that under certain conditions crime facilitates corruption and vice versa. 
This section presents the rough contours of a model mapping the linkages 
based on a discussion of competing claims regarding the direction of 
causality,11 direct and indirect linkages, shared determinants, and the 
issue of mutual causality. It concludes by stepping back to specify certain 
                                                 
11 Causality is an important question, of course, because causal direction shapes 
prescriptions designed to address the problem. If crime feeds corruption, then efforts to 
strengthen state controls over society should arguably precede efforts to control the state, a 
situation often seen given the political tendency to prioritize law and order over anticorruption 
efforts. But if corruption nurtures crime then fighting crime without first effectively reigning 
in state officials would be ineffective or, at best, yield just short-lived results. The latter 
sequential strategy can be seen in the statement by President Felipe Calderón following the 
revelations of the infiltration of drug trafficking high within the ranks of the office of the 
Attorney General (PGR): “I’m convinced that to stop the crime, we first have to get it out of our 
own house” (Lacey 2008).   
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conditions and limitations in the model. The discussion draws on the 
current literature generally and Mexico specifically.   
 
Crime  corruption (Society to state)  
Crime causes corruption. The one area in the literature pointing to 
and specifying a clear and direct causal link running from crime to 
corruption centers on organized crime, as noted. The seemingly strong 
consensus not only holds that organized crime cannot operate without 
corruption and that the two are intricately and inherently linked, but that 
organized crime corrupts state officials (see, for instance, Andreas 1998; 
Beittel 2011; Hanson 2008; Naylor 2003, 2009; O’Day and López 2001; 
O’Day 2001; Pimental 2003; Shelley 2005). The 1967 U.S. Task Force 
Report on Organized Crime was explicit in its causal logic: “all available 
data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted 
public officials” (cited in Kelly 2003, 128-129). In Mexico, of course, many 
analysts have long agreed with this viewpoint (see Lupsha 1995).  As 
Laurie Freeman (2006, 12) notes, “Doing business entails bribing and 
intimidating public officials and law enforcement and judicial agents . . . 
organized crime cannot survive without corruption, and it looks for 
opportunities to create and deepen corruption.”  
Certainly no one would suggest that only organized crime accounts for 
the nation’s corruption; still, organized crime is seen as having a 
corrupting influence. Through the payment of bribes to police, ministerios 
públicos, judicial institutions, mayors, customs officials, and others, 
organized crime gains important tools for the operation of their illicit 
enterprises, such as nonenforcement of the law (state acquiescence), 
information on the operations of police or rival criminal organizations, 
hiring and promotion decisions within state agencies, procurement 
decisions, logistical support, etc. For organized crime, corruption thus 
represents a means—apparently a necessary means—of conducting 
business and is generally considered preferable to violently confronting the 
state, though a second-best solution to simply avoiding it (Bailey and 
Taylor 2009). This mode of corruption represents, in turn, a form of state 
capture. The societal organization (criminal organization) uses illegal 
payoffs to divert the behavior of state officials away from that authorized 
by and for the institution and toward the objectives of the societal 
organization. Like a perverse form of privatization, organized crime uses 
extensive payoffs to state officials to capture police and other state 
officials.  
Examples from Mexico are sadly abundant. Starting at the top, in 
1997, the head of Mexico’s drug enforcement agency, General Jorge de 
Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was jailed for collaborating with Amado Carrillo 
Fuentes of the Juarez cartel. In 2008, the government’s Operación 
Limpieza allegedly uncovered payments, some as high as US $450,000 a 
month, to over thirty officials of SIEDO (Subprocuraduria de Investigacion 
Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada)—the agency in charge of 
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fighting organized crime—in return for providing confidential information 
to the Sinaloa cartel on law enforcement operations, including those of the 
US Drug Enforcement Administration (Latin American Mexico & NAFTA 
Report, November 2008; Padgett 2008). Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman 
Loera’s infamous escape from El Puente prison in Jalisco in 2001 revealed 
extensive payoffs to dozens of prison officials.12 The former governor of 
Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva Madrid, was convicted and imprisoned in 
both Mexico and the US for laundering money for the Juarez cartel. It is 
alleged that the governor received from $400 to 500,000 for each shipment 
that went through his state. In 2009, the infamous Michoacanazo featured 
the arrest (and subsequent exoneration) of over thirty local officials in the 
western state of Michoacán, all for alleged links to drug traffickers. Indeed, 
bribery and the “partial privatization” of police and state officials are 
perhaps most evident at the local level. Edgardo Buscaglia (cited in 
“Organized Crime Highlights Corruption…” 2011), for instance, estimates 
that in 2010, 72 percent of Mexican municipalities had “stable, open and 
notorious” organized crime presence, where the authorities “at some level” 
were protecting these groups. Though the outcome may be largely the 
same, such relationships often blur the line between corruption and 
intimidation. One report, for example, noted that in twelve municipalities 
in the state of Mexico, organized crime operated protection rackets not only 
with businesses, but with local and federal deputies who remained quiet 
because the criminal groups had them “identified and threatened” to harm 
their families (Milenio 10/6/2008) (see also Lacey 2008).  
But while this causal narrative makes sense for organized crime, it 
seems somewhat less clear with respect to other forms of crime. Though 
Jorge Castañeda (2011, 181) contends that in Mexico “lawlessness breeds 
corruption,” it remains difficult to imagine how everyday blue-collar street 
crimes such as robbery or even white-collar office crimes committed by 
individuals might directly promote corruption.13 For most crimes, evasion 
is the primary strategy and dominant mode of operation. Even so, there 
are many other crimes that might lead directly to corruption. Just like 
drug trafficking organizations seem to require corruption to operate, so too 
might various forms of fraud and illegality within society that are not 
commonly associated with organized crime or with street crime. Those 
involved in the informal economy, for instance, often have to bribe local 
                                                 
12 His more recent escape in 2015 from the Altiplano prison has also implicated numerous 
prison officials.  
 
13 Building on the cultural approach to corruption (see Husted 1999; Lipset and Lenz 2000), 
Castañeda (2011) seems to be pointing to culture as an antecedent variable that leads to both 
crime and corruption. In this narrative, Mexico sports a culture of lawlessness that in turn 
encourages citizens to engage in crime and, in turn, bribe and corrupt state officials (see also 
Catterberg and Moreno 2007).Coronado (2008) contends that this cultural viewpoint informs 
the orthodox narrative employed by international institutions. Occasionally, state officials in 
Mexico seem to embrace this view, essentially attributing corruption to the people and 
Mexico’s culture, including President Enrique Peña Nieto on September 7, 2014 (“Corrupción 
en México, un problema cultural” 2014).   
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officials to acquire “permission” to operate (Bailey 2014, 43). Payoffs to 
customs officials and others facilitate the introduction of contraband into 
the country. The operation of fake or unauthorized taxis often entails 
bribing key officials or quotas to party leaders.14 The ability of businesses 
to “disobey” everything from building to labor codes or escape taxes often 
seems to require corrupt payoffs to inspectors and other officials. 
Generally, it seems that the common denominators here involve more 
organized, ongoing criminal activities that are difficult to hide from the 
state rather than more individual, nonorganized, intermittent activities 
that are more successfully concealed from state enforcers. Given that 
evasion is likely the priority, only when such evasion becomes less 
practical is bribery or corruption more likely to occur (Bailey and Taylor 
2009).  
Beyond this direct link, crime may also lead to corruption indirectly as 
a result of the state’s reaction to crime (figure 1). At a macro level, greater 
real or perceived crime and the related social disorder and instability 
bolsters the need for the state to crack down on crime and establish order. 
This emphasis on security leads those in government, often with the 
public’s support (Malone 2013), to launch mano dura policies that in turn 
empower law enforcement while simultaneously weakening the constraints 
and checks on state agencies, thus increasing the likelihood of corruption 
and abuse of authority. This scenario plays out in a number of ways. First, 
as ends come to justify means, state officials increasingly engage in illegal 
activities (considered here as forms of corruption) such as torture, illegal 
detentions, forced disappearances and even extrajudicial killings all in the 
fight to “restore” order. Second, the rapid mobilization of state resources to 
battle crime and establish “law and order” expand the opportunities for 
abuse and corruption. Mexico’s deployment of the military to fight drug 
trafficking organizations, which dates back a number of years but began in 
earnest under President Calderón, significantly expanded the military and 
police’s exposure to corruption and abuses, resulting in a dramatic 
increase in allegations of human rights abuses, forced disappearances, 
extrajudicial executions, and corruption.15 Third, in a rather perverse way, 
increased enforcement threatens the operation of illegal activities and thus 
enhances their propensity to and reliance on bribery to operate. Edgardo 
Buscaglia (2008) refers to the “paradox” that comes from cracking down on 
drug trafficking: the more the government bears down on traffickers 
through the justice system, the more likely they are to corrupt and employ 
additional violence. Finally, in an even more round-about and indirect 
                                                 
14 Reyes (2006) notes thousands of illegal taxis are allowed to work in Mexico City as long as 
they carry a “black panther” sticker indicating their ties to the ruling PRD.   
 
15 Luis Rubio (2015, 45) contends that the high levels of violence and crime lay behind 
current efforts by President Enrique Peña Nieto to recentralize power. The preference of the 
current government, he avers, is to “reaffirm the presidential power and the control of the 
government over society.” On how enhanced security leads to human rights abuses see 
Carrasco (2015).  
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manner, high levels of crime raise personal feelings of insecurity and 
undermine trust in society and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, 
as Karstedt and LaFree (2006, 9) point out, raising at least the perception 
of increased corruption.16  
 
Figure 1. Crime  Corruption (direct and indirect linkages) 
 
 
 
Corruption  crime (State to society) 
As Peter Andreas (1998, 161) notes, corruption is a two-way street and 
“involves not only the penetration of the state, but also penetration by the 
state.” Flipping the causal model around captures Uslaner’s (2008, 17) 
proposition that “corruption leads to more crime.” While the prior causal 
equation relates to a specific class of crime (organized), this causal 
narrative tends to encompass a broader view of crime, and, like the prior 
model, occurs through both direct and, more importantly perhaps, indirect 
mechanisms.  
The direct causal relationship finds corrupt public officials promoting 
or encouraging criminal activities by members of society. This includes the 
complex schemes orchestrated by public officials (via conflict of interest, 
graft, fraud, etc.) that include associated crimes of civilian allies (again, 
beyond the crime of bribery), the coordination and operation of drug-
trafficking operations under the direction of corrupt state officials, the 
laundering of ill-gotten funds through front businesses or banks on behalf 
of state officials, or even the operation of an auto-theft ring by police. In 
contrast to the state capture model seen earlier, this causal scenario 
represents a form of societal capture, as Andreas notes, with individuals or 
                                                 
16 This may be more of a methodological point relating to the validity of the use of perceived 
corruption as a proxy measure of corruption than a theoretical point. Arguably, this measure 
of corruption captures more than just corruption and may also include general perceptions of 
government performance (Bailey 2009).  
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businesses convinced or compelled by payoffs, profits or the abuse of 
authority by corrupt officials to engage in criminal acts. Of course, the fact 
that state officials vested with authority are involved eases the way for 
civilians since it provides a certain degree of cover and lessens their 
likelihood of being caught and punished for their crimes.  
Disentangling cause and effect here is admittedly difficult. Before 
exploring the more indirect links whereby corruption causes crime, a brief 
historical detour into Mexico helps to crystallize the distinction here 
between these two causal equations. A large body of literature on Mexico 
contends that for years during the decades-long PRI-gobierno drug 
traffickers operated under a single hierarchy with public officials 
controlling, extorting from, and protecting their operations, a narrative 
that positions corruption as the independent variable nurturing criminal 
enterprises (see, for instance, Andreas 1998; Astorga and Shirk 2010; 
Flores 2009; Lupsha 1995; Shelley 2001; Shirk 2010). As Peter Lupsha 
(1995) contends, “key traffickers and trafficking routes in a centralized 
authoritarian system like Mexico always needed the ‘con permiso’ of those 
within the Federal District.” The powerful PRI-led state enforced the norms 
of operations on and among the various trafficking groups. Under the 
prevailing “rules of the game,” as George Grayon (2010, 29) contends, the 
authorities “allocated ‘plazas’” and “drug dealers behaved discretely, [and] 
showed deference to public figures.” When conflict among organizations 
emerged, state governors, under the direction of central authorities, 
stepped in to resolve it. This historic narrative, in sum, illustrates the 
corruption  crime model. 
Political changes in Mexico and in the industry itself in the twenty-first 
century ushered in a deterioration of the state’s control over drug 
trafficking organizations, however, and altered the direction of the causal 
equation, shifting Mexico away from the corruption  crime model toward 
one in which crime  corruption. The rise of political competition, the end 
of PRI’s grip at the state and national levels, and even democratization and 
liberalization in Mexico undermined the prevailing patterns of corruption 
by hampering PRI’s capacity to control the enforcement and 
nonenforcement of the law (Morris 2009; Snyder and Duran-Martínez 
2009, 262). As opposition parties began to capture ever greater control of 
state and local governments and, by 2000, the presidency, the number of 
potential protectors grew, thereby undermining the ability of a centralized 
state to guarantee its side of a corrupt bargain. In short, as local power 
increasingly fell outside the PRI-controlled networks, federal agents, local 
police, and corrupt officials all began to act more autonomously (Grayson 
2010, 31). With upper-level officials now unable to fully control lower-level 
officials, according to Vidriana Rios (2011), political decentralization 
altered corruption from a single-agent game to a multiple-agent game 
affecting the price of bribes, government’s incentives to enforce the law, 
and the level of political violence. In effect, this shifted the causal equation 
with ever more powerful drug trafficking organizations not only escaping 
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state control, but increasingly colonizing and capturing various state 
entities for their own purposes. This significantly altered the impact of 
drug trafficking and corruption in the country.17 
 Returning to the discussion linking corruption to crime and looking 
beyond the direct links tying corruption to crime, corruption also arguably 
plays an even more critical role in facilitating crime indirectly by creating 
the conditions conducive to crime (see figure 2). The literature here points 
to two broad-based intervening factors: institutional effectiveness and 
legitimacy. First, corruption facilitates crime by undermining the capacity 
of state institutions (law enforcement and the judiciary in particular) to 
deter crime. Reflected by high rates of impunity, weak institutions, 
according to the standard economic theory of crime (Becker 1968), lessen 
the likelihood of being caught and punished for committing a crime, 
thereby encouraging criminal activity (LaFree 1998, cited in Aguierre and 
Amador Herrera 2013, 223). Over a decade ago, Guillermo Zepeda (2004) 
calculated Mexico’s rate of impunity at a staggering 97 percent. In 2013, 
Mexico’s statistical agency INEGI, put the calculation at 94 percent 
(Zúñiga 2014). To be sure, corruption is not the sole source of the failure of 
the police or the entire justice system to investigate, arrest, and 
successfully prosecute criminals. Corruption shares blame with other 
aspects of weak institutions like outside political manipulation and the 
lack of resources, training, autonomy, oversight, , and public support. 
Still, corruption plays an important role in crippling the effectiveness of 
these institutions and distorting their operation. According to Luis Rubio 
                                                 
17 Though beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless important to emphasize the varied 
impact of these two causal models with respect to corruption and organized crime in Mexico. 
The societal capture of the first model—under the authoritarian and centralized PRI-
gobierno—facilitated the PRI’s political control, strengthened informal institutions, and even 
kept violence to a minimum (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009, 262; Celaya Pacheco (2009, 
1024).17 As Peter Lupsha (1995) contends, the state’s control over drug trafficking 
organizations went beyond the sharing of profits to the use of these organizations to assist 
the police and the political system by helping ensure PRI electoral victories and even token 
cases for the judicial system to help shore up a degree of legitimacy. Grayson (2010, 29) notes 
how the drug traffickers in those years “although often allergic to politics, helped the 
hegemonic PRI discredit its opponents.” In a sense, state control (corruption  crime) helped 
ensure that corruption served broader political interests, especially political stability and the 
power of the PRI. By contrast, the state capture model underlying the current situation in 
Mexico (crime  corruption) weakens rather than facilitates state control in that state officials 
tend to promote the objectives of the drug traffickers or criminal businesses rather than the 
formal and informal objectives of the state or the PRI. The absence of a centralizing authority, 
moreover, also results in heightened levels of violence both within society (intercartel violence) 
and vis-à-vis the state. The lack of a unified, overarching hierarchy of corrupt state officials, 
as David Shirk (2010, 11) points out, has contributed to the fractionalization of the DTOs, 
which increased the level of violence. According to O’Neil (2009), “By disrupting established 
payoff systems between drug traffickers and government officials, democratization unwittingly 
exacerbated drug-related violence.” Escalante Gonzalbo (2011) presents a similar argument: 
“As corrupt, inefficient and abusive as they are, the municipal police have to organize the 
informal and illegal markets… Where this local force capable of organizing the informal and 
illegal markets is missing, the result is perfectly predictable because the uncertainty 
generates violence.” 
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(2015, 81), “Mexico’s problem is not the criminality or the violence, but the 
absence of the government, the absence of competent governmental 
institutions capable of maintaining order, imposing rules, and earning the 
respect of the citizenry” (Rubio 2015, 81). 
Even beyond this impact based on the assumed rational calculations 
of criminals, the failure of law enforcement to protect individuals or the 
judiciary to protect people’s property or rights also tends to promote 
another sort of illegal activity. It prompts citizens to engage in illegal acts 
themselves to protect their own interests or pursue justice. This includes 
illegal acts by citizens associated with vigilante justice or similar actions 
designed to exact justice. If the state is incapable of providing security or 
resolving conflict within society, individuals and perhaps organization 
often feel forced to pursue their own justice, violating the law in the 
process. While vigilantism has a long history in Mexico, recent years have 
seen a spike in the number and scope of community self-defense groups, 
particularly in the states of Guerrero and Michoacán (on vigilantism in 
Mexico see Zizumbo-Colunga 2010, and Hinton and Montalvo 2014).  
A second intermediate factor linking corruption to crime is the lack 
of trust and legitimacy in the institutions of the state, particularly those 
related to the justice system, including the lack of trust in the law itself. 
Alongside Mexico’s staggering impunity rate resides a deep distrust of 
the police and the judiciary as well as the expectation of corruption, all 
products of real and perceived levels of corruption in the country. This 
lack of trust and legitimacy encourages crime in a number of ways. 
First, it prevents the public from cooperating with the fight against 
crime, a critical if not indispensable tool in the state’s ability to fight 
crime. In fact, as much as 60 percent of Mexico’s high impunity rate 
noted earlier stems from the public’s failure to report crime, owing to 
the lack of trust in and even fear of the police (Zúñiga 2014).18 At a 
broader level as well, the lack of trust in state institutions and the law 
carries a cultural effect, promoting disrespect for the law (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003). As Bailey (2014, 21) contends, “weak trust and 
confidence in the police and judiciary reinforce a civic culture of 
alegality, which, in turn, creates a context that tolerates illegality.” This 
goes beyond trust in the police and judiciary, however, and connects to 
the legitimacy of the government and the law itself. The public’s 
disillusionment in the law, law enforcement, and the state, particularly 
the perception that the law favors the rich, powerful, and the 
connected, undermines obedience to the law (Yankah 2013, 63).  
In many ways, there is an imitation effect involved: if the public 
believes that state officials are not bound by the law, then the public 
                                                 
18 In a cross-national study, Soares (2004) finds that high perceptions of corruption 
discourages victims from reporting crimes.  
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hardly feels compelled to adhere to the law either. When citizens regard the 
law as a tool manipulated by those in power for their own benefit, such 
vices “can make it clear to citizens that the law does not take them 
seriously as agents and is to be manipulated for personal gain, draining 
the legitimacy, the very lifeblood, from a system” (Yankah 2013, 63). As 
Rubio (2015, 18) points out, “No one feels obliged to comply with the law, 
above all when he observes that many others do not do so and even in the 
worst of circumstances application of the law can always be ‘negotiated.’” 
This point underlies Uslaner’s (2008, 59) assertion that “malfeasance at 
the top encourages street crime more than delinquency promotes 
dishonesty at the top.”  
Such views pervade Mexico. The 2012 National Survey of Political 
Culture, for example, finds substantial majorities agreeing that public 
officials are unconcerned about people like themselves (75.5 percent), 
and that when laws are made the politicians take into account either 
the interests of the political parties or their own personal interests (67.4 
percent) rather than those of the people (ENCUP 2012). When asked 
who violates the law the most, 37.5 percent of respondents to 
Transparencia Mexicana’s 2005 National Survey of Corruption and 
Good Government cited as their top response “politicians,” with another 
15.2 percent pointing to the police, and 14.2 percent to government 
workers (66.9 percent combined), while just 8.0 percent to citizens. 
When asked how much government officials abide by the law, not only 
did 73.3 percent select the response “a little,” but more chose the 
response “none” (17.2 percent) than “a lot” (9.5 percent). Such views 
clearly sustain the low levels of confidence historically found in Mexico’s 
public institutions. Indeed, in the 2011 National Survey of 
Constitutional Culture 79.6 percent of respondents felt that the people 
are insufficiently protected against the abuse of authority.  
A final indirect effect parallels the impact of the state’s efforts to 
address crime, noted earlier. Cracking down this time on corruption can 
have a perverse and unexpected effect on crime. As Vanda Felbab-Brrown 
(2011, 38) contends, the government’s efforts to reduce corruption and 
tackle high criminality in its law enforcement bodies has led to more 
insecurity, making existing corruption networks more “murky” (cited in 
Tromme and Lara Otaola 2014, 574). One concern is that the firing of 
corrupt police or police who fail confidence control evaluations leads to an 
uptick in crime as the former police join the ranks of organized crime or 
use their unique training and skills in the “private sector” in criminal 
activities. In a sort of revolving door operation, many former police and 
military officers in Mexico have gone on to pursue careers with DTOs, 
including the infamous and violent Zetas drawn largely from the ranks of 
the special forces of the Mexican military (Grayson 2008, 2010).  
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Figure 2. Corruption  Crime (direct and indirect linkages) 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Causality and Third Factors  
To the extent the literature addresses the crime-corruption 
relationship, much of it suggests a mutual, reciprocal, causal relationship 
linking the two. This broader causal model rests largely on a fusion of the 
two equations just outlined and is rather straightforward. Whether one 
starts the explanation with corruption encouraging criminal activity or 
criminals corrupting state officials, the point is that both occur 
simultaneously and that both undermine the state’s enforcement 
capabilities and weaken trust and legitimacy, thus setting the stage for 
more crime and more corruption. The result is a state of low-level 
equilibrium or what Bailey (2014) describes as a security trap.  
An important dimension of a mutual causal relationship is the 
existence of shared causal agents. Such shared determinants, of course, 
could also be part of a spurious relationship between crime and 
corruption. Many such third factors relate to the indirect factors cited 
earlier, but extend further out as factors directly affecting both variables 
(see figure 3). Weak law enforcement institutions, for example, not only 
nurture crime by reducing the likelihood of being caught and punished, as 
indicated, but they also feed corruption by reducing the risk of being 
caught and punished for corrupt acts (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003). Just 
as Mexico fails to prosecute those committing common crimes, few officials 
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are ever prosecuted for corruption, the abuse of human rights, or other 
state crimes. The responsibility to deter the “crime” of corruption falls on a 
different set of institutions than those fighting crime, a point returned to 
momentarily, but in Mexico the institutions of accountability are arguably 
weaker than the weak institutions focused on fighting crime. Though many 
bureaucrats in Mexico receive minor administrative sanctions through the 
SFP, officials are rarely investigated and prosecuted. Part of this 
institutional weakness stems from the lack of cooperation between police, 
the PGR, and the SFP (Tromme and Lara Otaola 2014, 573); part of it is 
the lack of political will. Not only are few police or military personnel 
prosecuted for corruption or violating human rights, but the reports and 
recommendations of both the ASF (Auditoria Superior de la Federación) 
and the CNDH (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos) often go 
unattended.  
In addition to sharing the institutions of justice and legitimacy, other 
“third” factors also play a role in shaping both crime and corruption in a 
similar direction. Poverty, inequality, and the policies of neoliberalism, in 
particular, have been shown to increase both crime and corruption rates. 
The meta-analysis of over 200 quantitative studies by Pratt and Cullen 
(2005; cited in Fox and Hoelscher 2012), for example, reveals the 
important role of poverty and inequality in influencing crime rates. In 
Mexico these factors have helped set the stage for the growth of organized 
crime and the dramatic rise of violence in recent years. According to 
Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza (2014), the growth of poverty and 
inequality stemming in part from the policies of neoliberalism facilitated 
the expansion of drug trafficking organizations since they provided the 
poor with an opportunity for upward mobility and security. Such factors 
also led to the expansion of the informal economy along with its 
accompanying corruption (Coronado 2008; Pansters 2012). At the same 
time, these factors (poverty, low levels of economic development, 
inequality, and the policies of neoliberalism) have also been linked to 
heightened levels of both real and perceived corruption (see Bayart 1993, 
cited in de Maria 2008; Coronado 2008; Sandoval 2013; Uslaner 2008; 
Uslaner and Rothstein 2013; Xin and Rudel 2004). As demonstrated most 
clearly by Uslaner (2008) and You and Khagram (2005), inequality not only 
plays a critical role in determining the levels of corruption, but in mutual 
causal fashion, corruption also serves to maintain or even worsen the level 
of inequality by further rewarding the rich, the powerful and the 
connected.  
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Figure 3. Mutual Causality and Third Factors 
 
 
 
Limitations, Specifications, and More Questions  
The positive associations just described, whether unidirectional or 
bidirectional, direct or indirect, seem to fit the Mexican case. Yet it is 
important to make clear the limitations or specifications incorporated into 
the model. When viewed from a different angle, crime and corruption can 
be seen as inversely (rather than positively) related or totally unrelated. To 
reiterate, Van Dijk’s (2007) cross-national study failed to show a 
significant correlation linking crime and corruption. Such specification 
involves disaggregating the two key concepts and the different state 
institutions involved as well as taking into account the external 
determinants that crime and corruption do not share, taking a step or two 
down on the ladder of abstraction.  
First, it is important to emphasize that the arguments tying corruption 
to crime and vice versa relate to rather specific arenas and types of crime 
and even types of corruption. Among other things, this means that while 
the two may interact and influence each other, they may account for only 
part of the variation or explanation. Crime (and primarily a certain class of 
crime) is one of many variables shaping corruption and only may affect 
certain classes of corruption (police, military, prosecutorial, judiciary, 
local, etc.). Corruption, similarly, may have a limited and specified effect 
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on crime and, again, be one of many factors shaping crime. Corruption-
induced impunity may encourage some to engage in illegal activities just 
as the lack of faith in the justice system may prompt some to take the law 
into their own hands, but most citizens prefer to abide by the law despite 
the prospects of impunity. As noted, much of the literature and argument 
linking crime and corruption relates to organized crime. This initial point 
represents quite simply the “warning label” attached to all probability 
equations.  
It is also important to differentiate among state institutions involved in 
crime and corruption. Though considered part and parcel of a country’s 
justice system, the specific institutions and agencies focusing on criminal 
activity are not the same ones targeting corruption. In Mexico, for example, 
corruption broadly conceived is handled (to the extent it is handled) by a 
range of institutions including the SFP and their embedded internal 
auditors throughout the federal bureaucracy, the ASF, the CNDH, the IFAI 
(Instituto Federal de Aceso a la Información), INE (Instituto Nacional 
Electoral), the Honor and Justice Commissions within police departments, 
and the specialized labor review boards and administrative courts. It is 
only the PGR (Procuraduría General de la República), however, that can 
prosecute officials for corruption (for overviews on police corruption in 
Mexico see Davis 2006; Fondevila 2008; Sabet 2010; and Uildriks 2009). 
Despite some overlap, particularly at the prosecutorial and judicial levels, 
these agencies and personnel are not the same as those devoted to 
preventing, investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating crimes. While there 
may be reasons to believe that if there is corruption and inefficiency in one 
area or arena, a similar degree of corruption and inefficiency will reign in 
others, this differentiation makes it possible that, theoretically at least, 
some institutions may perform far better than others. If we disaggregate, it 
is possible then to have within the same state the coexistence of weak/ 
ineffective/corrupt institutions alongside stronger/effective/noncorrupt 
institutions. By differentiating among state institutions, it thus becomes 
possible to envision a situation where state control over society is strong 
and repressive so as to maintain a low crime rate, but where accountability 
structures binding state officials to the rule of law are weak or vice versa. 
Indeed, Fukuyama (2014) highlights a number of countries where state 
strength is high and yet there are few controls on the state, resulting in 
high levels of corruption.19 Daniel Kaufmann (2010) points to the opposite 
                                                 
19 Fukuyama (2014) goes to great lengths to differentiate the institution of a modern state 
from the institutions of rule of law and democratic accountability. He spotlights the case of 
China where a modern state featuring a professional and largely autonomous bureaucracy 
faithfully implementing policy combines with weak institutions of the rule of law and 
accountability. However, the fact that state officials (not the bureaucracy) are not bound by 
the rule of law nor held accountable for their actions (resulting in corruption) suggests that 
there is not a modern and strong state, but one where certain parts of the state may be 
professional, but not others. The lack of rule of law among state officials that results in 
corruption by definition includes some segments of the state not properly carrying out its 
functions.  
© TRACTUS AEVORUM  2 (2). Fall/Winter 2015 
 
169 
phenomenon to support his conclusion that corruption and crime in fact 
are unrelated, citing the case of Chile where corruption is low and yet the 
crime rate remains high. These are all empirical questions.  
This differentiation of state institutions, moreover, is critical when 
coupled with the earlier point regarding the tendency for state officials and 
even the public to prioritize the fight against crime and violence—and the 
need for security and political stability—over fighting corruption. Viewed 
from this perspective, any sort of success in fighting crime would likely 
result in an apparent inverse relationship: a decrease in crime coupled 
with an increase in corruption and abuse of authority owing to the state’s 
anticrime fighting strategy. In short, corruption is often cast as a problem 
of secondary importance, a residual of the unintended consequences of 
more important policy concerns.20   
Finally, and expanding further on this last point differentiating 
institutions, it is important to recognize that while crime and corruption 
may share certain determinants, there are many they do not share. The 
literature review presented earlier largely supports this notion. Most 
studies of corruption point to institutional variables as primary causal 
agents, while others focus on such societal factors as tolerance and related 
cultural variables. Meanwhile, the predominant approach to the study of 
crime tends to focus on a different set of variables reflecting socioeconomic 
and even psychological phenomena of the individual. Indeed, it is the lack 
of shared determinants that leads Kaufmann (2010) to claim that crime 
and corruption do not always coexist. Even inside each factor, different 
classes of crime and different types of corruption stem from unique factors. 
Analyses of homicide and property crimes, for instance, show they are not 
caused by the same factors (Nueman and Berger 1988). Similarly, despite 
studies pointing to certain linkages between the two, the factors behind 
police corruption or low-level bureaucratic corruption are largely unrelated 
to those determining high-level political corruption (see Lofti 2014 and 
Uslaner 2008). Clearly, more work is needed in exploring these 
interrelationships between the various forms and classes of corruption.  
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this essay has been to explore the relationship between 
corruption and crime. The exploration has been largely theoretical, 
drawing on secondary sources with examples and illustrations from 
contemporary Mexico. The model developed here points to a complex 
                                                 
 
20 There has long been substantial theoretical support for the prioritizing of security and 
societal control over controls over the state. James Madison in Federalist Papers #51 
recognized the sequence, stating, “You must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.” Huntington (1968) and Fukuyama 
(2014) echo this same point, stressing how governments must first establish order and 
control by creating strong state institutions—what Fukuyama refers to as a modern state—
before developing the institutions of the rule of law and accountability that control state 
officials.  
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interplay of causal agents, resulting in both direct and indirect linkages 
moving in both directions, and hence the underpinnings of the low-level 
equilibrium model crafted by Bailey (2014). The model shows that 
corruption is one among many factors that exacerbate crime and that 
crime is one of many factors influencing corruption. Such models, 
moreover, suggest that efforts to attack crime, which tends to receive 
priority attention, are not only handicapped by corruption, but may make 
corruption worse, as seen in the case of Mexico. Similarly, attacking 
corruption without fighting crime may produce limited results or even 
make matters worse.  
This review, as noted, is part of a much larger study exploring the 
relationship between a government and a people’s control of society and 
the state. This broader project brings into focus the interplay between 
efforts to empower the state (in order to control society), while constraining 
it (in order to control the state) and those that seek to empower society (in 
order to control the state), while constraining it (in order to control 
society). This interwoven process of empowering and yet constraining 
society and state encompasses both various institutional agents and the 
ideological narratives and discourses that support the state’s institutions 
and policies, as well as the public’s attitudes, expectations, and metrics 
used to determine appropriate (i.e. noncorrupt) behavior, the contours of 
legitimacy, and thus the limits on power (state) and freedom (society). 
Using Madison’s pithy comment in Federalist Papers #51, “In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself,”  the broader 
project seeks to understand the state and societal mechanisms used to 
“oblige” the government to control itself (anticorruption), the extent to 
which this is tied to (facilitated by or undermined by) the government’s 
ability to “control the governed,” and whether it (the government) can 
indeed accomplish the first task without attending to the second task. 
Understanding the relationship linking crime, which is part of the 
government’s control “of the governed,” and corruption, which represents 
controls over “itself,” is but one dimension of this broader line of inquiry.  
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